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Abstract The paper deals with the development of an
advanced solution for a SIP communication server. Works
were carried out within the scope of Bright Embedded Solu-
tion for IP Telephony (BESIP) project. The output of the
project shouldbe amodular architecturewith additional func-
tionality such as speech quality monitoring and security of IP
telephony.We sought to unify the configuration of individual
components based on the NETCONF protocol. In order to be
able to implement the idea into OpenWrt, we had to integrate
a complex support for the NETCONF configuration proto-
col. Our modifications of OpenWrt in respect of NETCONF
were accepted by the OpenWrt community and have been
included in OpenWrt/Trunk branch. The paper explains and
describes the whole concept of the BESIP project and its
individual modules.
Keywords SIP · OpenWrt · BESIP · NETCONF ·
Security · Management · Monitoring
1 Introduction
The Bright Embedded Solution for IP Telephony (BESIP)
project was formally launched in mid-2011. Our intent was
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to develop a modular architecture for a SIP communication
server with additional functionalities such as speech quality
monitoring and protection against certain security threats.
The solution we developed consists of a SIP server running
on OpenWrt OS with key components integrated. The entire
system is distributed as an image is suitable for embedding
hardware with low computational complexity. Alternatively,
individual packages can be installed from SVN. Every soft-
ware solution includes its own configuration and manage-
ment. Accordingly, BESIP aims to be a scalable solution
with an emphasis on security and a unified configuration [1].
2 State of the art
As mentioned in the introduction, we discuss the implemen-
tation of a SIP communication server solution which would
be an alternative to several current implementations. The
main advantage of our solution is the ability to easily and
quickly set up a full featured PBX on almost any hardware.
We can presume that almost all implementations are based
on open-sourceAsterisk PBX,web-interface forAsterisk and
with a GNU/Linux distribution on the base layer.
At present, there are several projects that offer multipur-
pose IP telephony solutions for embedded devices and for
household or enterprise platforms. The initial project of a
GNU/Linux distribution which offers an easy set-up of IP
telephony in a few steps is the Asterisk@Home project. The
first version of this project was released on 29 April 2005.
This project integrated a web interface for Asterisk, Flash
Operators Panel to control and monitor PBX in real-time
and also offered a full FAX support within one bootable
image for almost any x86 PC. On 3rd May 2006 the devel-
opment of this project was discontinued and was replaced by
its successor Trixbox. However, the development of Trixbox
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does not seem to continue any more. Two existing projects—
AsteriskNOW [2] and Elastix [3]—now offer an alternative
to Trixbox. The former, AsteriskNOW appears to be similar
to Trixbox—apackedGNU/Linux distributionwithAsterisk
with a FreePBXweb interface on top of it. The latter, Elastix,
is a bit moremodular. Compared to any other project, it offers
a slightly more modular hierarchy to facilitate the applica-
bility to a multiple service server. The increasing popularity
of embedded devices, such as Raspberry Pi, is the reason
why the Micro Elastix [4] distribution was born. However,
all of those projects are either prepared for x86 machines
only or for specific hardware. Micro Elastix only supports
three platforms, namely PICO-SAM9G45, Raspberry Pi and
MCUZONE.
None of the projects includes a securitymodule thatwould
offer a complete IPS and IDS system to prevent attacks
against the SIP Registrar server. Also there is no module that
would monitor the quality of voice calls transmitted through
an integrated PBXor amodule that enablesNETCONF capa-
bility on them. Thanks to the portability of the OpenWrt dis-
tribution we can prepare a BESIP bootable image for almost
any device.
3 Design of architecture
The BESIP architecture is depicted on Fig. 1. There are four
basic modules: Core, Security, Monitoring and PBX.
First, we discussed the existing projects which we could
adopt and modify for our purposes. We considered the fol-
lowing open-source tools and applications:
• OpenWrt for good scalability and simple embedding;
• Kamailio for reliability and high availability [5];
• Asterisk and Kamailio as Back-to-Back User Agent
(B2BUA) and SIP Proxy [6];
• YUMA as NETCONF server [7] and OpenWrt UCI as
configuration backend;
Fig. 1 BESIP architecture
• SNORT with SNORTSAM and IPtables as an intrusion
detection and protection system [8].
The core is divided into the following parts: OpenWrt as
build platform; NETCONF to administer the entire system,
Web GUI for a user-friendly configuration and SUBVER-
SION as a revision control system. The security module is
based on SNORT, SNORTSam and IPtables [8,9]. The mon-
itoring module exploits a tshark package and our developed
tool which provides information about the quality of a par-
ticular speech [10,11]. The Zabbix agent is used to report
basic states of the entire system. Finally the PBX module is
developed on Kamailio in conjunction with Asterisk. Both
individual packages and the whole image for particular HW
used for testing of pre-released distributions are available for
download [12].
Several open-source applicationswere adopted and imple-
mented into the developed modules. However many modifi-
cationswere required in the implementation, especially in the
OpenWrt coremodule. This is due to a complicated porting of
applications intoOpenWrt buildroot.Our patcheswere tested
and accepted by the OpenWrt community. Having observed
and discussed various open-source solutions, OpenWrt was
selected as the primary platform. There are many packages
included; packages not included can be added into the appli-
cation tree. Even if for certain packages this is not an easy
procedure, especially for packages without configure script,
we opted for this solution. OpenWrt is well-known for excel-
lent support, solid ticket system, relatively good documenta-
tion and cooperation with the community of developers.
4 Core module
The long-term goal of this project is to make the BESIP
configuration independent of clients. Today, many systems
are configurable using web, SSH or telnet. Each of them
offers its own semantics and configuration file. The BESIP
project aims to change this situation, using NETCONF as the
defined communication and management protocol. In addi-
tion, configuration independent syntax will be available on
all modules. During the first stage of the project, applica-
tions and libraries were ported. Afterwards, we focused on
implementingNETCONF,UCI, PBX, Security andMonitor-
ing modules. The NETCONF protocol allows the device to
send and receive configuration data throughXMLdocuments
using the RPC paradigm [13,14]. These XML documents are
handed over the RPC calls. The RPC request is initiated by a
client that requests the configuration data or a command to be
performed on the server. While these requests are being per-
formed, the client is blocked until he receives the RPC reply
from theNETCONF server [7,13]. The responses consist of a
configuration that is either complete or partial. Another reply
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Fig. 2 Management based on
NETCONF usage
is a message informing us whether a command was success-
fully performed on the server. See Fig. 2 to understand the
configuration data flow defined in BESIP. The structure of
configuration data on the NETCONF server in the YUMA
package (netconfd) is specified by the YANG module which
defines the semantics and syntax of a management feature
[15]. The configuration data is stored securely on the NET-
CONF server and all requests and responses must comply
with a firmly defined structure, specified by YANGmodules.
Next, a global database of all the configurable parameters is
required and its role is performed by the NETCONF server.
The configuration parameters are inserted by the user and
stored on the NETCONF server. Consequently, the stored
configuration data is accessible through simple queries. It
makes the device quickly configurable, therefore a backup or
a configuration restore can be performed easily and quickly.
YUMA is a package which provides tools for the network
management. We ported YUMA into OpenWrt success-
fully. It consists of NETCONF client yangcli, NETCONF
server netconfd, validation tools yangdiff and yangdump and
netconf-subsystemwhich allows us to communicate with the
NETCONF server through a SSH2 subsystem.OpenWrt uses
UCI as a configuration backend. It is a group of configuration
files which can be read or modified by common UCI API.
The NETCONF protocol is applied for the BESIP configu-
ration. The advantage of this approach lies in particular in
the exact definition of the data model; possibility to call any
function through a remote procedure call; data model editing
in YANG and independence on client. A RFC draft of YANG
data model for interface configuration was applied to verify
proposed functionalities [16]. We combined several applica-
tions and packages to achieve NETCONF’s overall function-
ality. The libnetconf [17] library, which has been developed
by CESNET as an open-source project since 2009, is a part
of our implementation. The NETCONF protocol exploits a
specified mechanism for OpenWrt distribution which is a
platform for embedded equipment. The primary goal is to
provide a suitable environment for small routers with mini-
mum requirements on processor, flash and RAM. Although
the implementation is mostly problematic due to the cross
compilation; the image generation for embedded equipment
is very well parameterized. We exploit this fact in our auto-
build script supporting the following targets: asuswl_500gp-
brcm47xx, besiphw1-x86 and tplink1043nd-ar71xx. Each of
these targets represents a set of variables defining parameters
for the generation of an image of particular hardware [12].
The diversity of configuration interfaces is a remark-
able feature of most applications and libraries based on
GNU/Linux kernels. However, almost every application or
tool is configured in a different way. OpenWrt deals away
with the issue how to configure more applications in one
configuration tool. Unified configuration interface (UCI) is
the configuration interface in OpenWrt. All packages sup-
porting this way of configuration can read the UCI config-
uration data format and create their configuration files from
this data. The advantage lies in the independence of indi-
vidual implementation. UCI provides an interlayer between
the user and the application, simplifying configuration for
users and unifying API for applications. We adopted UCI
as the primary database of application’s configuration data,
our concept is depicted in Fig. 3. UCI only defines a format
of configuration directives and access to them but not their
exact content or relation to each other. That depends on the
user. Typically if the user modifies the name of a network
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Fig. 3 Concept of NETCONF
and UCI interoperability in
OpenWrt
interface, the subsequent libraries will fail unless the mod-
ification is performed in all locations where it is necessary.
Our approach addresses two significant issues. First issue is
the imperfection and variability of the existing UCI. The sec-
ond issue is a large number of scripts ensuring parsing and
the formation of configurations from universal UCI files. The
YANGmodel defines the exact configuration structure which
enables to detach a substantial part of the code from current
applications. If users change the UCI file, the content is auto-
matically validated within the YANG schema and users are
notified in case of a failure.
5 PBX module
The PBX module operates as SIP proxy or SIP B2BUA,
depending on the configuration. Generally, the module also
ensures call routing. Asterisk is used to distribute calls and
performs the PBX functions. Kamailio is used to proxy SIP
requests, to normalize the traffic and to ensure security [5,6].
When developing VoIP solution, there are always two fac-
tors involved. The first one is high availability and reliabil-
ity, the second one is the issue of advanced functions. Many
developers try to find a compromise. We implemented both
and our BESIP is able to adapt to user’s requirements. A
more complex system can handle many PBX functions such
as call recording or an interactive voice response. However,
due to its higher complexity, it is more prone to fault. On
the other side, SIP proxy is a simple piece of software which
can perform call routing, is more fault resistant but it is also
more difficult to incorporate the advanced PBX functions
into it [18,19]. BESIP offers users the possibility to choose
how the system will work. For this reason, BESIP includes
bothKamailio andAsterisk. Today, only one of these engines
can be configured but in the future, both engines will work
together and will be configured by the common NETCONF
server. Kamailio will be able to route requests even if Aster-
isk is out of order. Advanced PBX functions, however, will
be unavailable.
Billing is an important feature of every SIP server. Inmany
systems, billing is divided into two separate steps. The indi-
vidual calls are processed and a call detail record (CDR) is
generated for every call performed. These CDRs are stored
in a text file or a repository. The second step is ensured
by an application which enables to perform statistics over
data stored, i.e. to search and display results according to
requested criteria. This is a conventional scenario, classical
approach of many billing applications and highly reliable
as the PBX function is not affected by the billing. Even if
there is an issue with the billing software, PBX still operates
properly. There is, however, one big disadvantage: during
the call setup, PBX cannot provide an authorization which is
well-known from pre-paid services offered by mobile oper-
ators. Taking this into account, we are able to perform more
checks and operations at the call setup level. For example,
we can look at user’s credit and block a call where the credit
has been overdrawn or is low. Similar to this, we can autho-
rize every call against a threshold such as maximum price
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per minute/trunk/global. These thresholds can be pre-set or
changed dynamically according to the actual user’s credit.
Considering this, PBXwill be safer andmore resistant against
attacks the aim of which is to misuse PBX [20].
6 Security module
The aim of the security module was to make the developed
system as secure as possible. In case some security incident
occurs, BESIP immediately addresses the situation and noti-
fies the administrator about the event in a detailed report. The
core of the entire IPS solution is the IDS system Snort which
detects malicious activity in the network. The detection is
based on signatures or detection of anomalies. The Snort-
Sam application allows Snort to dynamically intervene into
IPtables rules and the traffic detected is then blocked for some
time. Once the attack is over and timed out, the blocked IP
is allowed to communicate again. Thus, only malicious traf-
fic that poses a threat to our server is blocked. If more soft
faults appear from some IP, it is blocked at the IPtables level.
This approach can effectively block incorrectly configured
clients and servers. For example, if a client sends REGIS-
TER with proper credentials, it is not an obvious security
attack. But if the client attempts to register repeatedly, ask-
ing for computing sources at the SIP REGISTRAR server
with every registration, such attempts can be denoted and
blocked for a certain time. Security precautions against these
attacks include Snort rules tracking the number of messages
sent to the SIP server from a particular source address. The
blocking rules were similar in most cases, like for example
this Snort rule for blocking an unwanted register flood:
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $SIP_PROXY
$SIP_PORT (msg:“SIP DoS attempt(registerflood)”; con-
tent:“REGISTER sip”; detection_filter:track by_src, count
50, seconds 5; classtype:misc-attack; sid:1000001; rev:1;
fwsam:src, 10min;)
Administrators can use the Zabbix or NAGIOS agent
inside BESIP to gather all information directly into their
monitoring system. Monitoring is an important part of the
security module. The BESIP team had focused on the issue
in early stages of project designing [1]. Depending on hard-
ware used, BESIP can resistcertain DoS attacks [21]. If hard-
ware is strong enough to detect some security incidents on
the application level, the source IP is immediately dropped.
With weak hardware, this can, however, pose a serious prob-
lem. The features of our security module were verified in a
test-bed and results are depicted in Figs. 4 and 5. The CPU
load was monitored during trivial SIP attacks.
The Snort, SnortSam, IPtables (SSI) line is the response
when the security module in BESIP is active. The following
dependencies were measured without SSI. Only two types of
DoS attacks were emulated, namely REGISTER flood and
Fig. 4 Attack effectiveness based on REGISTER flood
Fig. 5 Attack efficiency based on INVITE flood
INVITE flood. We used sipp generator to generate the for-
mer, and we used inviteflood tool to generate the latter. The
dependencies in both figures clearly prove the ability of the
security module to mitigate the attacks performed.
7 Monitoring module
The overall solution of themonitoring system consists of sev-
eral different open source components plus the part that was
developed for this purpose to meet the defined requirements.
We use a computational E-model [22], simplified for the pur-
pose of the implementation. The computation canbe split into
several elements and is expressed by eq. (1). The used values
were adopted from recommendation ITU-T G.107 where the
default values are listed and finally we need to express only
two uknown parameters Id and Ie−e f f which are described
in eqs. (4) and (5).
R = 94.7688 − 1.4136 − Id − Ie−e f f + 0 (1)
The simplified E-model only takes into account the effects
from codec, packet loss and end-to-end delay. The situation
is depicted in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6 E-model in a simplified version
The computed R is converted to MOS value. For this pur-
pose, relations (2) and (3) were applied [23].
MOS = 1 for R < 6.5 and MOS = 4.5 for R > 100 (2)
MOS = 1 + 0.035 · R + R · (R − 60) · (100 − R)
·7 · 10−6 for 6.5 ≤ R ≤ 100 (3)
Factor Id represents all impairments which are caused by
different combinations of delays. We applied a linear regres-
sion to results gained in AT&T laboratories [24] and derived
relation (4) which provides accurate results, with regression
quality r=0.99 ranging from 0 to 400ms.
Id =
{
0.0267 · T T < 175ms
0.1194 · T − 15.876 175ms ≤ T ≤ 400ms (4)
Packet-loss dependent effective equipment impairment fac-
tor Ie−e f f is derived using the codec-specific value for the
equipment impairment factor at zero packet-loss Ie and
packet-loss robustness factorBpl , both listed inAppendix I of
ITU-T G.113 [25]. With packet-loss probability Ppl , I e−e f f
is calculated using the equation (5).
Ie−e f f = Ie + (95 − Ie) · PplPpl
Burst R + Bpl
(5)
BurstR is the so-called burst ratio, defined as the ratio
between “Average length of observed bursts in an arrival
sequence” and “Average length of bursts expected for the net-
work under a random loss”. The system itself consists of three
logical components which are a web interface that serves
the administrators (Web GUI), part of the script (Scripts)
that controls gathering data necessary to compute the speech
quality in the simplified E-model. The last component is
the Quality Monitor which contains the logic for calcula-
tion itself and processes data obtained by scripts. All data is
stored in a SQLite3 database. The open source tool Java API
SQLiteJDBCwas selected to enable communicationwith the
database. Speech quality monitoring is controlled through a
web interface that is accessible from the main crossroads
management interface (the situation is depicted in Fig. 7).
The web interface is written entirely in the PHP scripting
 
Fig. 7 Overview of the logical structure of VQM
language in order to enable starting or stopping the monitor-
ing system through the OpenWrt shell as it depends on shell
applications such as tshark (a small terminal-based network
analyzer). Scripts are launched through the web interface of
the monitoring tool enabling the monitoring as such. In prac-
tice, this means starting the network traffic capture with the
tshark toolwith theRTPfilter activated. The usage of theRTP
filter makes working with RTP streams much easier as these
streams contain some important statistical data (packet loss,
jitter) and other important information (source/destination
IP, codec) necessary to calculate the speech quality in the
E-model. The developed application offers the comfort of
management in a web application, the developed interface
aggregates required functions.
The function state diagram is depicted in Fig. 8. By click-
ing the Start button, the PHP script _start.php is launched at
the server side using the Java script and Ajax which launches
the _start.sh shell script in the background. It activates tshark.
It is terminated every 900s and data obtained from the RTP
filter is written into the sterams.log file. At this stage, the
recalculation is not performedafter each step.The script auto-
matically computes the parameters and clears streams.log
after three predefined rotations. By clicking the Stop but-
ton, the _stop.php script is launched using the Java script
and Ajax at the server side. The _stop.sh shell script ter-
minates any tshark and sh_start.sh processes by means of
the kill command. The application automatically calculates
the results after three finished cycles of tshark, i.e. after
45min. By clicking the Results button, the _perform.php
script is launched using the Java script and Ajax at the
server sidewhich runs the _perform.sh shell script.Where the
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Fig. 8 The function state diagram
background monitoring is currently running, the php script
first launches _stop.sh, then performs the calculation (_per-
form.sh) and finally resumes the monitoring using _start.sh.
Where the monitoring is turned off, only the part with the
the_perform.sh script is performed.
The _perform.sh shell script contains the start of Java
application QualityParser written for this purpose. The
contents of the file that stores information from tshark
(streams.log) is deleted once the data had been processed.
The Erase button deletes all records in the database. The
page does not refresh automatically after the button has been
pressed, it must be refreshed manually (by using the Refresh
button). The function is applied to erase all records from the
SQL database.
8 Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of theBESIP system,we
tested our BESIP running on low-end HW platform contain-
ing x86 Intel Atom D410, RAM 1GB/677MHz and 16GB
SSD. The performance test was carried in accordance with
new standard RFC 6076 with our own benchmarking tool
[26]. We found out that the tested platform with BESIP is
able to handle 256 registrations per second and is stable up
to 6000 registrations. Its limitation is 90 simultaneously run-
ning calls.When this limitwas exceeded,we observed unsuc-
cessful calls and a rapidly increasing SRD (Session request
Delay);for example75% rate of successfully established ses-
sions in case of 150 simultaneous calls and with SRD over
60ms.
9 Conclusion
The output of our work is the entire BESIP concept and its
implementation. As we mentioned, BESIP consists of sev-
eral componentswhich are distributed underGPL as an open-
source solution. Several of them, for example the components
in Security and PBX modules, were adopted fully; some of
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them, like for instance the Core module, in a modified ver-
sion. Finally we developed our own tool for Speech quality
assessment. The contribution of our work is not only the cod-
ing of the BESIP system; we also conceived the idea of the
unified configuration management with unified CLI syntax
which enables to configure different systems (in our case
Asterisk and Kamailio). BESIP is distributed as a functional
image for x86 platform but can be run on Vmware or KVM.
Its configuration is available through a web browser or SSH
client [12].
We noted that we still need to solve many issues. Individ-
ual packages are working, version 1.0 was released after sev-
eral pre-releases in November 2011 and version 2.0 will be
released in mid-2013. New release 2.0 will be based entirely
on NETCONF with one API to configure the entire system.
Further, CLI syntax is being developed andwill be connected
to NETCONF. CLI will be independent of internal software
so when any internal software is modified, there will be no
need to make changes in the configuration. In addition, CLI
and NETCONF configuration will be independent of hard-
ware and version. To export a configuration from one box and
to import it to the next one would be a simple task. Users will
only need to modify a single configuration file to manage the
entire box. After this step, all internals of configuration will
be hidden as was mentioned in the introduction. All BESIP
binary images from nightly autobuild can be downloaded
from [12].
Acknowledgments This work was supported by the European
Regional Development Fund in the IT4Innovations Centre of Excel-
lence Project (CZ.1.05/1.1.00/02.0070) and by the Development of
human resources in research and development of latest soft computing
methods and their application in practice Project (CZ.1.07/2.3.00/20.
0072) funded by Operational Programme Education for Competitive-
ness, co-financed by ESF and state budget of the Czech Republic.
OpenAccess This article is distributed under the terms of theCreative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
References
1. Macura, L., Voznak, M. (2012). Embedded multiplatform SIP
server solution. In 35th International Conference on Telecommu-
nication and Signal Processing, TSP2012 (pp. 263–266).
2. AsteriskNOW, a complete Linux distribution with Asterisk, the
DAHDI driver framework, and, optionally, the FreePBX adminis-
trative GUI. http://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisknow.
3. LANDIVAR, Edgar. (2011). Unified Communications with
Elastix, Vol. ASIN B0056IXJRC.
4. uElastix, embedded variant of Elastix distribution. http://uelastix.
org/.
5. Madsen, L.,Meggelen, J., &Bryant, R. (2011).Asterisk: The defin-
itive guide. Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media.
6. Goncalves, F. (2008). Building telephony systems with OpenSER.
Birmingham: Packt Publishing.
7. Enns, R., et al. (2011). Network Configuration Protocol (NET-
CONF), IETF RFC 6241.
8. Voznak, M., & Safarik, J. (2012). DoS attacks targeting SIP server
and improvements of robustness. International Journal of Mathe-
matics and Computers in Simulation, 6(1), 177–184.
9. Voznak, M., Rezac, F., Tomala, K (2010). SIP Penetration test sys-
tem. In 34th International Conference on Telecommunications and
Signal Processing, TSP2010 (pp. 497–503).
10. Cano, M., & Cerdan, F. (2012). Subjective QoE analysis of VoIP
applications in awireless campus environment.Telecommunication
Systems, 49(1), 5–15.
11. Jelassi, S., Youssef, H., Hoene, C., & Pujolle, G. (2012). Single-
ended parametric voicing-aware models for live assessment of
packetizedVoIPconversations.TelecommunicationSystems,49(1),
17–34.
12. Source code of BESIP Project (2012), LipTel Team. http://liptel.
vsb.cz/mirror/besip/nightly
13. Cutuli, G., Mumolo, E. Tessarotto, M. (2002). An XML-based vir-
tual machine for distributed computing in a For/Join framework.
In24th InternationalConference InformationTechnology Interface
(pp. 471–477).
14. Chisholm, S., Trevino, H. (2008). NETCONF Event Notifications,
IETF RFC 5277.
15. Scott, M. Bjorklund, M. (2010). YANG Module for NETCONF
Monitoring, IETF RFC 6022.
16. Bjorklund, M. (2010). YANG—A data modeling language for the
network configuration protocol (NETCONF), IETF RFC 6020.
17. Libnetconf, NETCONF library in C. http://code.google.com/p/
libnetconf.
18. Chochelinski, R., Baronak, I. (2009). Private telecommunication
network based on NGN. In 32nd International Conference on
Telecommunications and Signal Processing (pp. 162–167).
19. Simoes, J., & Magedanz, T. (2011, December). Contextualized
user-centric multimedia delivery system for next generation net-
works. Telecommunication Systems, 48(3), 301–316.
20. Rezac, F., Voznak, M., Tomala, K., Rozhon, J., & Vychodil, J.
(2011). Security analysis system to detect threats on a SIP VoIP
infrasctructure elements. Advances in Electrical and Electronic
Engineering, 9(5), 225–232.
21. Sisalem, D., Kuthan, J., & Ehlert, S. (2006). Denial of service
attacks targeting a SIP VoIP infrastructure: Attack scenarios and
prevention mechanisms. IEEE Network, 20(5), 26–31.
22. ITU-T. (12/2011). The E-model: A computational model for use
in transmission planning, Recommendation ITU-T G.107. Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, (pp. 10).
23. ITU-T. (2011). The E-model: A computational model for use in
transmission planning, Recommendation ITU-T G.107. Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union.
24. Cole, G., & Rosenbluth, H. (2001). Voice over IP performance
monitoring. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication, 31(2),
9–24.
25. ITU-T. (2007). Transmission impairments due to speech process-
ing, Recommendation ITU-T G.113. International Telecommuni-
cation Union.
26. Rozhon, J., & Voznak, M. (2011). SIP registration burst load test.
Communications in Computer and Information Science, 189(2),
329–336.
123
Advanced solution of SIP communication 549
Miroslav Voznak is an Asso-
ciate Professor with Dpt. of
Telecommunications, Technical
University ofOstrava.He received
his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees
in telecommunications, disserta-
tion thesis “Voice traffic opti-
mization with regard to speech
quality in network with VoIP
technology” from the Technical
University of Ostrava, in 1995
and 2002, respectively. Topics of
his research interests are Next
Generation Networks, IP tele-
phony, speech quality and net-
work security. He was involved
in several FP EU projects.
Jiri Slachta is a M.S. student
with Department of Telecommu-
nications at Faculty of Electri-
cal Engineering and Computer
Science, VSB- Technical Uni-
versity of Ostrava. His profes-
sional activities are focused on
Embedded systems, Networks
and Application development for
mobile systems. He received
dean’s appreciation for his bach-
elor thesis in 2011.
Lukas Macura is a Ph.D. stu-
dent with Dpt. of Telecommu-
nications at Faculty of Electri-
cal Engineering and Computer
Science, VSB- Technical Uni-
versity of Ostrava where he fin-
ished his bachelor and Master of
Science studies. His professional
and research domain is network-
ing protocols and network man-
agement applications.
Karel Tomala is a Ph.D. stu-
dent with Dpt. of Telecommu-
nications at Faculty of Electri-
cal Engineering and Computer
Science,VSB-TechnicalUniver-
sity of Ostrava where he received
his M.S degree in telecommuni-
cations. His research is focused
on new methods of speech qual-
ity assessment and he takes his
professional interest in Networks
and Application development.
123
